This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median voter in a Meltzer-Richard (1981) framework. We use computerized and real human co-players to distinguish between these sets of motivations. Redistribution to real co-players has a negative effect on the median voter's tax rate choice. Further, perceived income mobility decreases the desired amount of redistribution. Our results suggest the importance of concerns about own mobility as well as status concerns of the median voter who tends to keep distance to the low-income group, whereas inequity aversion does not play a role in the political economy context.
Introduction
Individuals care about the distribution of income and its redistribution. They may care because they have genuine other-regarding preferences. Alternatively, a desire for (re-)distribution may be purely instrumental and caused by motivations that are genuinely fully sel…sh. This paper provides experimental evidence for genuinely sel…sh motives for redistribution and own income mobility to be the more important drivers for redistributional preferences.
Genuine other-regarding preferences may be based on several considerations. Individuals could dislike highly asymmetric outcomes because they …nd them unfair and feel better if the distribution is more even. Likewise, individuals may feel sorry for the ones having less and su¤er from others having more than themselves. 1 Alternatively, individuals may genuinely like it if others gain -whether or not these others are rich or poor-because they feel altruism or compassion. Or they may dislike this, because they are spiteful or envious, or because they have a genuine concern for status and a desire for high own relative standing. Such feelings may have developed through an indirect evolutionary approach by which types and mutations of types are described by their preferences. 2 Adam Smith (1759) described such preferences and claimed their existence in the very …rst paragraph of The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
How sel…sh soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.
Rather di¤erently, redistributional preferences may follow purely instrumental motives. For instance, individuals may prefer stable institutions and may …nd the commitment of a society for some amount of redistribution desirable, because their own income position may be subject to negative or positive shocks, and they enjoy the insurance aspect of governmental redistribution. 3 This insurance motive may then be larger or smaller, depending on the individual's perceptions about the likelihood of own upward (downward) mobility. 4 Moreover, individuals may care about their income position relative to others, because relatively high income is a signal of future high income, or because it grants access to absolutely scarce goods and opportunities, including improved prospects in the marriage market. 5 Which of these reasons applies or is the more important cause of distributional preferences is relevant both for a theory of economic behavior and for welfare considerations. It is not easy to discriminate between these theories empirically. In the experimental laboratory, however, we can discriminate between some classes of these theories. In particular, we can test whether or not a preference for more redistribution is driven by the existence of a given reference group; hence, whether individuals genuinely care about the co-players with whom they interact, and whether they prefer the payo¤s of their co-players to be closer to their own payo¤. For this purpose we consider individuals in several treatments that are variants of the well-known MeltzerRichard (1981) framework, which is the benchmark model for describing the political economy process of redistribution. In this framework individuals know the general distribution of abilities and their own ability. They then choose their preferred proportional income tax. The median voter preference is implemented, and individuals choose their labor e¤ort, followed by taxation of gross incomes and lump-sum per-capita redistribution. We consider several variants of this framework, where the co-players are real subjects in some treatments and where there are no human co-players in some other treatments.
More speci…cally, we consider a 2 x 2 design. The treatments di¤er along two dimensions. One dimension introduces or removes a human reference group: in two of the treatments the individuals interact with players that are simulated by computers, and each individual knows that any redistribution is between himself/herself and the computer. In two other treatments the individuals choose their favorite amount of income redistribution, knowing that their co-players are real human beings and anticipating the resulting distribution of incomes after redistribution. Genuine preferences for equity should materialize in the treatments with real co-players, but not in the treatments with computer-simulated co-players. For the player who has the median position in the society, this suggests more redistribution if the player interacts with real players than if the player interacts with a computer.
The second dimension distinguishes between two types of income mobility across a series of independent but identical games. In one type of games, the individual keeps his/her gross wage and position in the income hierarchy throughout all games. In the second type of games, the individual is assigned di¤erent positions in the income distribution throughout the rounds. Such income mobility throughout the (independent) rounds of the experiment may a¤ect the individuals' perception of e¢ ciency and tax distortion as well as their comparison to the reference group. By a random-matching design we eliminate possible (quasi) repeated game e¤ects in all treatments.
We …nd that, in the absence of own income mobility and when removing the reference group, players maximize their own material payo¤. They be-have closely in line with the theoretical predictions of the Meltzer-Richard (1981) framework. Interaction with real players yields a (weakly signi…cant) deviation from the Meltzer-Richard predictions, but this deviation is in the opposite direction of what would be predicted by a theory of inequity aversion: individuals choose less redistribution in the presence of a reference group than when they interact with computers. Compared to the prediction from maximizing material payo¤, median voters adjust the income distribution in favor of the rich, at the expense of both the poor and themselves. One possible explanation is that the presence of real co-players makes median voters care more about overall e¢ ciency and total payo¤s. Also, if individuals have status concerns, median voters may try to distinguish themselves more clearly from the poor, rather than trying to be closer to the rich. By choosing lower tax rates, the median voter can keep a larger distance to the group of low-productivity individuals. 6 We also …nd that income mobility across formally independent rounds has a signi…cant impact on median tax rates. It makes individuals choose lower redistributive taxes than with …xed productivities, and this e¤ect is large and statistically signi…cant when players interact with computers. A reason for this result might be that the individuals develop a stronger sense for e¢ ciency when experiencing di¤erent roles during the experiment. The redistributiondecreasing e¤ect of own income mobility across rounds is smaller and insigni…cant when players interact with real players. Moreover, the e¤ect from introducing real co-players is not signi…cant in the treatments with income mobility.
If individuals choose lower tax rates than predicted because they care about overall e¢ ciency, such considerations should be more pronounced in the treatment with ‡uctuating productivities where income positions are changing during the experiment. The size of the e¤ect of a reference group, however, is smaller (although not signi…cantly di¤erent) in the treatment with ‡uctuating productivities than in the treatment with …xed productivities. This suggests that status concerns vis-à-vis the poor are the more consistent explanation for the observed choices on redistribution. Such status concerns could also explain why the e¤ect of the reference group becomes insigni…cant when income positions are changing during the experiment and hence, on average, di¤erences across individuals are equalized.
The work by Meltzer and Richard (1981) has stimulated a large empirical literature focusing on the relation between income and preferences for redistribution; these studies, however, have led to mixed results. 7 In the experimental laboratory, the many additional aspects that determine preferences for redistribution and interact with the benchmark e¤ects can be removed or controlled for. The theory of inequity aversion developed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has generated considerable debate and has played a dominant role in many areas of economics more recently. Whether or not inequity aversion is at work in the context of political decision-making on income distribution is, hence, a question of major importance. 8 While we are not aware of any experiment that analyzes other-regarding preferences in a framework that incorporates the Meltzer-Richard theory, existing experimental evidence mainly supports the importance of social preferences for choices of redistribution, but also the im- 7 Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) …nd that Swiss citizens' demand for redistribution increases with income and higher self-positioning, which they interpret as being in contradiction with the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. Corneo and Grüner (2002) …nd a negative impact of higher income for individuals' desire for more income redistribution, but they also show that social rivalry and social norms are relevant determinants. Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999) argue that their calibration model of a dynamic Meltzer-Richard framework predicts transfers that are "quite close" to empirical data. Moene and Wallerstein (2001) show that deviations from the Meltzer-Richard prediction on the impact of inequality can be explained by distinguishing among di¤erent categories of welfare spending. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) …nd evidence for a strong relationship between own earnings prospects and attitudes towards redistribution for Russia.pact of e¢ ciency considerations. Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) analyze a case where subjects endowed with di¤erent income levels vote on a …xed amount of redistribution. They …nd that Fehr-Schmidt-type inequity aversion may explain their experimental results on voting on redistribution. Engelmann and Strobel (2004) challenge the role of inequity aversion, asking whether ef…ciency considerations and maximin preferences could be a more compelling explanation for experimental …ndings. In their experiment, subjects choose between di¤erent income allocations. By varying total and relative payo¤s, Engelmann and Strobel explain the observed choices as being driven by selfishness together with e¢ ciency concerns and maximin preferences, rather than inequality aversion. Durante and Putterman (2009) focus on the role of self-interest, risk aversion, and fairness considerations in a framework with redistributional taxes; their results mainly provide support for the importance of self-interest. Krawczyk (2010) analyzes preferences for redistribution of randomly generated income and distinguishes whether the probabilities of winning a high income are randomly assigned or result from individual effort/ability. Similarly, Esarey, Salmon and Barrilleaux (2010) use a laboratory experiment to measure the role of left-wing or right-wing ideology for redistributive preferences. In our analysis, we consider preferences for redistribution in an institutional framework where individuals choose both income-generating e¤ort and a redistributive tax rate, and where taxation involves incentive costs. By establishing a benchmark for redistributional choices in the absence of a reference group, we …nd deviations from material payo¤ maximization, but the evidence suggests that these deviations must be attributed to theories other than genuine other-regarding preferences.
In the next section, we describe the theoretical political economy framework, the experimental set-up, and the theory predictions. The main experimental results are in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. Our experiment is based on the framework by Meltzer and Richard (1981) (MR). We consider an economy that consists of three individuals. Individual i 2 f1; 2; 3g has a commonly known productivity (wage) w i where w 1 < w 2 < w 3 and is a player in a two-stage game.
In Stage 1, each individual i states a proportional tax rate i 2 [0; 1] which he/she would like to implement in the economy. The mechanism that determines the tax rate selected and implemented for the economy is a shortcut of the median voter theory (as employed in MR): we simply assume that the median choice of the three preferred tax rates is selected and implemented.
In Stage 2, each individual i knows the implemented tax rate and chooses a work e¤ort x i 2 R + . The individual wage is equal to the output it generates. Given the tax rate and all three individuals' e¤ort choices, individual payo¤ equals
This payo¤ consists of the following components. The own e¤ort choice together with the individual productivity determines an individual's gross income as w i x i . This gross income is taxed at the tax rate . Moreover, there is a disutility from work e¤ort which is assumed to be equal to x 2 i =2. Finally, the tax revenue is used solely for lump-sum redistribution. If there are n individuals, each individual obtains the same share 1=(n 1) of the tax payments of the other (n 1) individuals in the economy, where here n = 3. This constitutes the last term in (1). Hence, as in the case with in…nitely many individuals, individuals correctly anticipate that their own tax payment has a zero impact on the redistributive transfer they obtain.
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To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, we …rst determine the optimal e¤ort choice given the tax rate . Di¤erentiating (1) with respect to x i yields an optimal e¤ort choice which is equal to
Hence, individual i's e¤ort is equal to the own net wage rate. Note that it is independent of the choices and productivities of the other individuals. Inserting this e¤ort choice for individuals 1; 2; 3 into individual i's payo¤ function (1) yields a payo¤ of
If each voter chooses the tax rate that maximizes his own payo¤, given that this tax rate is implemented and given that this induces all other individuals to choose their payo¤ maximizing work e¤ort, the …rst-order condition with respect to transforms into
Examining the second-order condition shows that the individual with the highest wage w 3 prefers a tax rate of zero,
Individual 1 with the lowest productivity prefers a strictly positive tax rate which is given in (4). The optimal tax rate choice of individual 2 with the median productivity is equal to
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The median voter prefers a strictly positive tax rate whenever w 2 is su¢ -ciently small such that he bene…ts from redistribution.
Experimental design and hypotheses
Design The experiment maps a Meltzer-Richard framework in which a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity exists. The general research question is how individuals vote on redistribution if redistributive taxation is distortive and individuals vote on a tax rate as well as generate income to which the tax rate is applied. More speci…cally, we consider four treatments which are designed to answer two sets of questions. First, how do individuals vote on redistribution between themselves and real players in a reference group, compared to a situation in which there is no reference group? An answer to this question yields insights about whether other-regarding preferences are genuine, or derived by genuinely sel…sh motives. Second, how do tax rate choices within one round change when the individual productivity can change between (independent) rounds? How do such ‡uctuations of productivity in ‡uence the median voters'preference for redistribution?
In order to isolate the additional e¤ects of other-regarding preferences and of varying productivities, we use a 2 2 between-subjects design. Our …rst question is on the impact of other-regarding preferences on the individuals' preferred tax rates. Here, we contrast a setup where participants are grouped into economies consisting of three 'real individuals' (real coplayers) with a treatment where a participant's co-players were simulated by computers (simulated co-players). In the treatments with real co-players, the participants were told that, in each round, they would be grouped into economies of three participants, one with a low productivity, one with a medium productivity, and one with a high productivity. The same applied to the treatments with simulated co-players, but here, the participants were informed that only one player per group would be a 'real participant' and that the other two individuals in this economy would be replaced by com- puters -hence, their co-players would be computers. It was stated in the instructions that the computer would choose tax rates and work e¤ort so as to achieve the highest payo¤ for the respective simulated player. All other aspects of the experiment remained exactly the same in the treatments with real and with simulated co-players. Changes of productivities throughout the rounds of the experiment can have important e¤ects on preferred tax rates, as we will discuss in greater detail when we state our main hypotheses. Changing the participants'roles (individual with low, medium, or high productivity) during the experiment could a¤ect their perception of tax distortion e¤ects, could lead to stronger empathy with the other individuals, and may change the notion of a 'fair' tax rate. We distinguish two setups. In the treatments with …xed productivity, the participants kept their role/productivity throughout all rounds of the experiment. They were told that, at the beginning of the experiment, their productivity would be randomly assigned and that they would keep this productivity in all rounds of the experiment. In contrast, in the treatments with ‡uctuating productivity, the participants were informed that their productivity would be newly assigned in each round with equal probability of obtaining one of the productivities. Each single round, however, was com-pletely identical to the treatments with …xed productivity, since the current productivity was announced at the beginning of each round. Table 1 summarizes the four treatments: "FixedSim" and "FixedReal" on the one hand, and "FluctSim" and "FluctReal" on the other hand.
In each of the four treatments, the two-stage game described in the previous section was played 12 times. The participants of the experiments were students from di¤erent …elds of study. 9 In each session, after the instructions had been read, the participants had to answer questions regarding their understanding of the experiment. By answering these questions, the participants earned their endowment in the experiment. After the 12 rounds, the participants had to …ll in a questionnaire with statistical information. Finally, the participants were paid in private. One session lasted about 75 minutes, and, on average, a participant earned 14 euros, plus a show-up fee.
In each round, individuals were grouped into sets of three players. In the treatments where co-players were simulated, this was revealed to the participants. The productivities used in all treatments were equal to w 1 = 0, w 2 = 3, and w 3 = 6.
Thus, in each group consisting of three players (either three real players or one real and two simulated players), there was one player with a productivity of 0, one with a productivity of 3, and one with a productivity of 6. If players choose their work e¤ort according to the theory prediction given in (2), payo¤-maximizing tax rate choices are (w 1 ) = 50%, (w 2 ) = 33%, and (w 3 ) = 0%;
dependent on the individual productivity w i 2 f0; 3; 6g (compare (4)- (6)). The sequence of actions per round was as follows. At the beginning of each round, the participants were displayed their productivity and had to state the tax rate (as an integer between 0 and 100) they would want to implement in their economy. The computer selected the median tax rate within an economy (consisting of 3 players), which was implemented in this economy and round. 10 The implemented tax rate was displayed on the computer screen, and then the participants had to choose their work e¤ort as a nonnegative real number. 11 At the end of each round, participants were displayed their own choices and their own payo¤.
In the treatments with simulated co-players, once the tax rate was implemented, the computer chose the payo¤-maximizing work e¤ort (as in (2)) for the simulated players, which is independent of the other players'decisions. The simulated players'preferred tax rate depends on work e¤ort choices in stage 2. We let the computer choose the simulated players'preferred tax rate as if work e¤ort choices are in line with the theory prediction. Of course, we do not use these choices as observations. Our analysis uses the real players' choices of their preferred tax rates as observations, and these are independent of the tax rates the computer would choose for the simulated players.
In the instructions, the participants were told that, in each round of the experiment, they would be randomly re-matched with two other participants to form a group. In fact, in the experiment, without being precise about that, we used matching groups of 9 participants to randomly be divided into three 'economies'to obtain a larger number of independent observations. In the treatments with simulated co-players, a matching group consists of only one 'real participant'.
Predictions The treatments with simulated co-players constitute an important benchmark when determining preferences for redistribution in a framework with distortionary redistributive taxation. Here, we can examine whether subjects understand the disincentive e¤ect of higher tax rates for work e¤ort and the implication for redistributive taxes. The median tax rate in the FixedSim treatment establishes the median voter's preferred tax rate in a framework where (i) other-regarding preferences and similar considerations can be excluded as potential factors that shape redistributional preferences and (ii) the individuals'balancing of tax distortion e¤ects versus redistribution is undisturbed by ‡uctuations of individual productivity.
Using the observed choices in the FixedSim treatment as the baseline for a comparison, we are able isolate the e¤ect of other-regarding preferences on the preferred amount of redistribution. We compare a) tax rate choices in FixedSim treatment to choices in the FixedReal treatment, and b) tax rates in FluctSim treatment to those in the FluctReal treatment. Let^ m denote the average of the empirically observed median tax rates (the preferred tax rates of the individuals with median productivity). If individuals have only self-regarding preferences, maximization of own monetary payo¤ leads to the …rst main hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 a) In the treatments with …xed productivity, median tax rates are the same with real co-players as with simulated co-players:
b) In the treatments with ‡uctuating productivity, median tax rates are the same with real co-players as with simulated co-players:
If other-regarding preferences a¤ect the median voter's preferred tax rate and individuals have inequity aversion, we should observe median tax rates in the treatments with real co-players that are higher than in the treatments with simulated co-players:
Intuitively, by choosing a higher tax rate, the median voter increases the income of the poor individual in the society, and at the same time, he decreases the distance between his income and the income of the rich individual. Hence, the median voter's preference for redistribution should be stronger when individuals care about equity. Then, we analyze how changes in productivity a¤ect median tax rates. Since rounds are completely independent and there is no uncertainty about the productivity in each single round, standard economic theory predicts that ‡uctuations of individual productivity do not change the median tax rates compared to the case of …xed productivities.
Hypothesis 2 a) In the treatments with simulated co-players, median tax rates are the same with ‡uctuating productivity as with …xed productivity:
b) In the treatments with real co-players, median tax rates are the same with ‡uctuating productivity as with …xed productivity:
If ‡uctuations of individual productivity during the experiment lead to median tax rates that di¤er from those observed with …xed productivity, there are several possible explanations for such a change in behavior. First, when productivity changes during the experiment, individuals may perceive productivities as being random even in the actual round and therefore de-velop a stronger sense of e¢ ciency. They may take the tax distortion effect better into account and adapt their tax rate choice accordingly. This would lead to median tax rates being lower with ‡uctuating productivity than with …xed productivity. Second, when individuals experience di¤erent productivity levels, in the treatments with real co-players this may increase their empathy for the di¤erent productivity types; the additional e¤ect on median tax rates, however, is ambiguous. 12 Third, when individuals care about the other individuals'total payo¤ in the experiment, then the e¤ect of other-regarding preferences should be weaker with ‡uctuating productivities than with …xed productivities, because total payo¤s are equalized in the treatments with ‡uctuating productivities. In the case of real co-players, this should lead to lower median tax rates with ‡uctuating productivity than with …xed productivity. In the treatments with simulated co-players, the second and third e¤ects of ‡uctuating productivities are excluded by construction: since co-players are simulated by computers, we do not expect empathy for other individuals or other-regarding preferences to play any role. Thus, if median tax rates in the FluctSim treatment di¤er from those in the FixedSim treatment, we would expect median tax rates to be lower in the FluctSim treatment. Other-regarding preferences could not explain such deviations from the theory prediction; a di¤erence would have to be attributed to the fact that individuals perceive productivities as random and changing over time and therefore choose tax rates that are less distortive. Comparing the treatment e¤ects of ‡uctuating productivities in the cases of simulated and real coplayers, we can shed light on the question of how other-regarding preferences interact with ‡uctuations of productivity, in addition to the change in the perception of e¢ ciency.
Results
This section discusses the main results of our study. Before turning to the tax rate choices, we will examine how the participants adjusted their work e¤ort in reaction to the implemented tax rate. Finding out whether tax distortion of work e¤ort is in line with the theory prediction and whether there are di¤erences between treatments is an important building block for the analysis of preferred tax rates.
We estimate work e¤ort as a function of the net wage,
where w ikt is the productivity/wage rate of individual i in group k and round t and kt is the tax rate valid in group k and round t. According to the theory prediction, the slope of the function f should be equal to 1 since predicted work e¤ort is equal to the net wage (see (2)). To allow for di¤erent slopes in the di¤erent treatments, we interact the net wage with dummy variables Fluct, Real, and FluctReal=Fluct Real, included in a vector T R. The variable Fluct (Real) is equal to one if the observation comes from a treatment with ‡uctuating productivity (real co-players), and zero otherwise.
In the same way, we allow for treatment-speci…c intercepts. We estimate a linear regression of the form
The estimation results are shown in Table 2 . 13 The most important coe¢ cient is 0 , which estimates the marginal impact of the net wage on e¤ort choices; the estimated coe¢ cient is equal to 1:002 and therefore perfectly in line with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the
Work e¤ort
Estimated equation 14 As a …rst main result, we …nd that individuals behave almost perfectly in line with the theory prediction when choosing their work e¤ort, and they behave very similarly across treatments, in particular when we consider only rounds where the participants have already become familiar with the framework. Thus, the individuals understand the disincentive e¤ect that higher taxes have for choices of e¤ort, and they choose their e¤ort so as to maximize their monetary payo¤. In turn, they were also able to anticipate the tax distortion e¤ects when stating their preferred tax rate. The fact that individuals understand the trade-o¤ between more redistribution and stronger distortions of e¤ort choices is an important prerequisite for the following analysis of preferred tax rates. Now we turn to the main part of our paper and analyze tax rate choices. Our estimations will focus on median tax rates and test Hypotheses 1 and 2 on equality of median tax rates across treatments. To start with, we give an overview of tax rate choices; Figure 1 plots the average preferred tax rates in each round, separated by treatment and productivity level.
First, as it becomes obvious in Figure 1 , in all treatments preferred tax rates are lower the higher one's own productivity. Hence, independent of the nature of the co-players and productivity changes, own material interest seems to be a strong driving force of tax rate choices. Second, tax rate choices of voters with high productivity are on average 5 6% in all treatments and therefore close to the theory prediction of 0%. Tax rate choices of low-productivity voters show more variance, both over time and across treatments (treatment averages are between 57:9% and 73:4%); moreover, they are higher than the theory prediction of 50%. Both higher mean and higher variance could be explained by the fact that those preferred tax rates had almost never been implemented, and thus there was little chance of learning what e¤ect such high tax rates would have for individual payo¤s.
Third, and most importantly, Figure 1 shows that there are di¤erences in median tax rates across treatments. In the FixedSim treatment, the average median tax rate is 34:6% and hence almost exactly equal to the theory prediction of 33%. Hence, in the absence of all possible e¤ects that could disturb the tax rate choices, the median voter selects tax rates that perfectly re ‡ect the trade-o¤ between redistribution and e¢ ciency, as predicted by MR. Taking into account other-regarding preferences or ‡uctuating productivities, however, distorts this choice. With ‡uctuating productivities (FluctSim), the average median tax rate is only 23:9% and therefore clearly lower; the same occurs in the FixedReal treatment, where we also observe lower median tax rates (26% on average). This is a surprising result, since the consideration of inequity aversion should have caused median tax rates to be higher. Finally, median tax rates are lowest in the FluctReal treatment (19:3% on average).
Altogether, the inclusion of real co-players leads, both with …xed and with ‡uctuating productivities, to a decrease of median tax rates, although with ‡uctuating productivities this e¤ect is smaller. Similarly, the fact that productivities are changing during the experiment decreases median tax rates; here, the e¤ect is weaker with real co-players than with simulated co-players. Hence, even if the e¤ect per se may be surprising, both variations in the experimental setup lead to a consistent change in median voters'choices of tax rates. We will discuss the implications of these results below, after estimating the standard errors corresponding to the average median tax rates. For this purpose, we estimate the median voter's tax rate choice kt in group k and period t as a function of treatment dummies (vector T R) as well as control variables for individual-speci…c characteristics (vector CON T ROL). 15 The estimation results are shown in Table 3 . The constant 0 measures the average median tax rate in the FixedSim treatment, which is the baseline category in the estimation. In estimation (1), 1 and 2 measure the average e¤ect of ‡uctuating productivities (Fluct) and of real co-players (Real), respectively. Estimations (2)-(4) include the interaction term FluctReal=Fluct Real; hence, 1 ( 1 + 3 ) estimates the average e¤ect of ‡uctuating productivities if co-players are simulated (real participants), and 2 ( 2 + 3 ) estimates the average e¤ect of other-regarding preferences in the cases of …xed ( ‡uctuating) productivities (compare Figure  2) . In addition, estimations (3) and (4) control for individual-speci…c characteristics. 16 The results basically con…rm what the overview of preferred tax 15 Again, we cluster standard errors on the level of matching groups to control for nonindependence of observations. 16 The control variables use data from the exit questionnaire and include gender, age, height, number of siblings, and …eld and year of study. Apart from gender, age and year of study turn out to have small signi…cant e¤ects. The dummy variable "economist" indicates students from economics, business administration, and business mathematics (in
Median tax rate
Estimated equation ( ; ) signi…cant at 1% (5%,10%). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the level of matching groups). Table 3 : Regression results for median tax rates. rates has already suggested. Median tax rates in the FixedSim treatment almost perfectly match the theory prediction, but median tax rates in all other treatments are lower.
Hypothesis 1
Consider …rst the impact of real co-players, which allows us to examine how other-regarding preferences interact with the balancing of redistribution versus e¢ ciency. Overall, introducing a reference group has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on median tax rate (see 2 in estimation (1); the corresponding p-value is 0:058). Estimations (2)-(4) separate the e¤ect of real co-players across treatments with …xed and with ‡uctuating productivities. We …nd that there is a strong negative e¤ect of having real instead of simulated co-players in the treatments with …xed productivities (see 2 ). Median tax rates are by about 10 percentage points lower with real than with simulated co-players; the di¤erence is signi…cant as soon as we control for individual-speci…c characteristics. Contrary to what one might have expected, we …nd support for median tax rates being lower, rather than higher, when including the reference group.
The treatment e¤ect of real co-players is weaker in the treatments with total 17:8% of the participants). ‡uctuating productivity (measured by 2 + 3 ), and it is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The change in median tax rates, however, has the same sign: including other-regarding preferences into the picture leads, if at all, to lower tax rate choices of the median voter. Thus, our evidence suggests that inequity aversion does not play a role for tax rate choices; if at all, other-regarding preferences cause an adjustment of tax rates in the opposite direction than predicted. 17 After testing Hypothesis 2, we will discuss possible explanations for this …nding.
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Hypothesis 2 Contrary to the theory prediction, changing the productivities during the experiment leads to lower tax rates. The average impact of ‡uctuating productivities is signi…cant at the 5%-level (see 1 in estimation (1); p-value is 0:024). Moreover, if we separate treatments with simulated and with real co-players, we …nd a large and signi…cantly negative e¤ect of ‡uctuating productivities in the case of simulated co-players where median tax rates decrease by 10 percentage points (see a 1 in estimations (2)- (4)). The e¤ect is weaker and no longer statistically signi…cant in the case of real co-players (compare 1 + 3 in estimations (2)-(4)).
Keeping in mind that rounds are completely independent from each other and exactly identical in all treatments, this is a strong result. First, in the case of simulated co-players, this e¤ect cannot be attributed to a di¤erent perception of co-players in the sense that, for instance, individuals develop increased empathy with other individuals because of productivity ‡uctua-tions. An explanation remains that the variability of productivities makes individuals perceive their own productivity as being random, even if, in each particular round, the productivity is …xed. Such a perceived randomness should lead to lower preferred tax rates because e¢ ciency concerns become more pronounced.
Taking together the results from all four treatments, we will now discuss whether redistributive choices are in line with some widely applied explanations for preferences for redistribution. In particular, we will focus on four categories of other-regarding preferences: inequity aversion, reciprocity, maximization of group payo¤s, and status concerns.
Inequity aversion. If median voters'preferences express inequity aversion, this should lead to an upward adjustment of median tax rates in order to achieve more redistribution compared to the own payo¤-maximizing choice. An increase in redistribution reduces both the distance to the poor and to the rich individual, which increases the utility of inequity-averse individuals. Our estimation results, however, show that such an adjustment of median tax rates can be rejected: in all estimations, we can reject that median tax rates are higher with real than with simulated co-players when productivities are …xed, and we do not …nd a di¤erence when productivities ‡uctuate.
Looking only at the treatments with real participants, one might think that individuals do express some degree of inequity aversion since there is less redistribution, although insigni…cantly, when productivities ‡uctuate and payo¤ di¤erences are equalized throughout the experiment. In the same way, however, ‡uctuating productivities lead to lower median tax rates in the treatments with simulated co-players, where the e¤ect cannot be attributed to other-regarding preferences, but rather to a di¤erent perception of mobility. On the contrary, the fact that 3 is positive means that including both ‡uctuating productivities and other-regarding preferences has weakened one or the other e¤ect, or both (the joint e¤ect of Fluct and Real is smaller than the sum of the isolated e¤ects; see also Figure 2 ). Hence, taking into account the strong e¤ect of ‡uctuating productivities in the treatments with simulated co-players does not leave room for interpreting the weak di¤erence between FixedReal and FluctReal as inequity aversion.
Reciprocity. Alternatively, the fact that median tax rates are lower in the presence of real co-players could hint at reciprocal behavior: by choosing lower tax rates the median voter might try to induce higher work e¤ort choices by high-productivity individuals and in this way increase his own monetary payo¤. To analyze more closely this hypothesis, we run the regression on work e¤ort only for the individuals with the high productivity and estimate the tax elasticity in "some interior interval". In the estimations shown in Table 4 , we estimate work e¤ort choices as in Table 2 above, restricting observations to high-productivity individuals and implemented tax rates being between 10 and 50.
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Considerations of reciprocity should lead to a stronger tax elasticity of e¤ort choices in the treatments with real participants, i.e., a larger estimated coe¢ cient . As the estimation results show, however, we do not …nd evidence for reciprocal behavior in the sense of a larger in the estimations with real co-players. In contrast, the tax elasticity in the treatments with real participants does not di¤er from the elasticity in the treatments with simulated participants (compare coe¢ cients 2 and 2 + 3 ). This is in line with the estimation in Table 2 where we did not …nd treatment di¤erences with respect to work e¤ort choices.
Work e¤ort of high-productivity individuals
Estimated equation Table 4 : Tax elasticity of e¤ort choices of high-productivity subjects.
Maximization of group payo¤s. If median voters care about total payo¤s within their society, this would explain why we observe lower tax rates whenever there are real co-players. (In addition, we would expect e¤ort choices to be higher; the estimation results in Table 2 , however, con…rm that effort choices maximize own monetary payo¤.) Concerns about group payo¤s should be more pronounced in the treatments with ‡uctuating productivities, where individuals experience di¤erent roles throughout the experiment. Here, the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ shifts in favor of e¢ ciency considerations because equity is restored through income mobility. While median tax rates are indeed lowest in the FluctReal treatment, the impact of real co-players is much weaker in the treatments with ‡uctuating productivities compared to those with …xed productivities, and it is statistically insigni…cant. Experiencing di¤erent roles already reduces the tax rate choices of median voters in the treatments with simulated co-players, where it cannot be interpreted as an attempt to maximize group payo¤s. Hence, even if group payo¤s may play a role for individual choices, we do not …nd consistent evidence for such behavior.
Status considerations. A …nal explanation remains that median tax rates express status concerns: the choices of tax rates might be driven by income comparisons with the poor and the rich individual. While the monetary payo¤ of the rich is considerably higher than the median voter's payo¤ (unless the tax rate approaches 100%), redistribution blurs the di¤erence between the poor and the "middle class"; by choosing lower tax rates, the median voter can keep distance to the group of poor individuals. Since ‡uctuating productivities equalize di¤erences across individuals throughout the experiment, such status concerns should be much more pronounced in the treatments with …xed productivities. Indeed, in the treatments with …xed productivities we observe a signi…cantly negative e¤ect of introducing a reference group, while in the treatments with ‡uctuating productivities this e¤ect becomes weaker and is no longer signi…cant.
Summarizing, we interpret our …nding on the role of other-regarding preferences as positional concerns of the median voters when they vote on redistribution.
Our experiment also reveals interesting …ndings with respect to gender di¤erences. 21 A considerable amount of empirical evidence suggests that male beings are more willing to assume risks (Byrnes, Miller and Schafer 1999) , and evolutionary biologists and economists have argued that greater sexual selection pressures for men may have shaped their higher risk-taking as a useful strategy in "winner-take-all" situations. 22 Applying these considerations to the context of income distribution, male subjects may care more about their income position relative to the top earners and may be willing to sacri…ce income in absolute terms if this brings them closer to the top income position, whereas females may care more for high absolute income. Translated to the tax rate choices, males with median income should choose higher tax rates than females: if median voters choose more redistribution, this implies that the income distance to the rich individual is reduced, accepting that also the distance to the poor decreases. In turn, median tax rates should be lower whenever the individuals'status concerns are expressed vis-à-vis the poor rather than relative to the top earners. Using statistical information about the participants of our experiment, we …nd that, on average, tax rates preferred by males with median productivity are 10% higher than those chosen by female median voters (compare "male" in estimations (2)-(4) in Table 3) . 23 This di¤erence is in line with the idea that tax rate choices are a¤ected by status concerns and relative standing comparisons, rather than by group payo¤ or inequity considerations. 21 See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a survey of gender di¤erences in experiments in economics. 22 Risk-taking, or the choice of the higher variance outcome, in turn, is a viable strategy in some types of competition for high rank or status (Dekel and Scotchmer, 1999) . 23 Note that male + male Real is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (p-value is 0:018); hence, looking only at treatments with real participants, this con…rms our result of more redistribution being chosen by male participants.
Conclusion
In this paper we consider median voters'decisions on income redistribution in a formal framework that has been introduced by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and that has become the benchmark model for the study of the political economy of redistributive taxes. Our main research question is on the distinction between instrumental, but genuinely sel…sh motives for income redistribution, and genuine other-regarding preferences. We focus on the median voter, who represents a member of the middle class. We ask: is this representative of the middle class mainly guided by motives that are genuinely sel…sh, and is redistribution therefore mainly instrumental for achieving what can ultimately be identi…ed as sel…sh goals? Or do voters have genuine other-regarding preferences? The main tool for distinguishing between these two sets of distributional concerns is to eliminate human co-players from the picture in one half of the treatments, and to replace them by computerized automated coplayers. We …nd that the desired amount of redistribution for the middle class is highest if the individual income position is stable over time, whereas the desired amount of redistribution decreases in a less stable environment. Second, voters choose less redistribution -thereby implementing a less egalitarian society-if their co-players are real human players. This result strongly indicates that inequity aversion, if it exists at all in political economy contexts, must be superseded by other types of other-regarding preferences that dominate for the overall e¤ect. The type of other-regarding preferences that is mapped well by the data is an aspiration of the middle class to be di¤erent and more clearly distinguishable from the poor.
